This paper examines how the issue of political support affects the design of social insurance. It distinguishes between redistributive character and size of social protection. Three main results emerge. First, it may be appropriate to adopt a system which is less redistributive than otherwise optimal, in order to ensure political support for an adequate level of coverage in the second (voting) stage. Second, supplementary private insurance may increase the welfare of the poor, even if it is effectively bought only by the rich. Third, the case for prohibiting (supplementary) private insurance may become stronger when the efficiency of private insurance markets increases.
Introduction
This paper is inspired by the current debate about the future of social protection. On the one hand, there appears to be some consensus that social insurance per se plays an important and overall positive role in modern societies. On the other hand, there appears to be the concern that the current systems may be ill designed and not be sustainable (both financially and politically) in the long run. Consequently, one of the major problems that arises is to know how the current systems ought to be reformed to ensure their viability and their ability to provide appropriate coverage in the future. This is the issue we are considering in this paper, though in an admittedly stylized way.
The role and design of social insurance has traditionally been studied within a welfare economics framework. From that perspective, social insurance can play two roles. First, it may correct market failures when informational problems (such as adverse selection) prevent private markets from offering an appropriate level of coverage. Second, it can play a redistributive role, complementing other tax / transfer policies (see Rochet (1991) and Cremer and Pestieau (1996) ). The optimally designed social insurance system then strikes a balance between these positive effects and the welfare cost (distortions) associated with its financing.
Though insightful, this approach does not, however, appear to account for all the dimensions of the current debate. Political economy considerations constitute one of the omissions and a potentially serious one! To illustrate this point, let us consider one of the prominent issues, namely the choice between a minimal program, solely intended to relief poverty, or a more ambitious and generous system which reduces the uncertainty faced by all individuals. It is often argued that the appropriate choice between these two approaches involves a tradeoff between efficiency cost (distortions) and political sustainability. The main argument in favor of the minimal view is that such a social insurance costs less, and thus requires lower payroll taxes, inducing smaller distortions. The main argument in favor of the more generous view, on the other hand, is that such a social insurance in the Bismarckian tradition concerns everyone in society, thus attracts more political support and resists better to its rolling back.
The latter of these arguments goes beyond the scope of traditional welfare economics by raising the potentially important issue of political support. This is one of the features on which political scientists have traditionally focused when 1 dealing with social protection. More recently, the economics literature has also 1 See, for instance, Esping-Andersen (1990) who has explored the historical roots of these different types of social protection systems. He has argued that the flat-rate formula which provides the broader spread of benefits is likely to attract the wider political support. 2 addressed this issue. However, all the existing contributions are very much in line with the minimal (and means-tested) vs. generous (and universal) controversy mentioned above. Consequently, they appear to neglect one of the crucial features of social protection: in reality, social insurance systems do not just differ in their size (extent of coverage) but also in their more or less redistributive character. Furthermore, each of these dimensions can be expected to affect the political 3 support drawn by a given system. For instance, when the system provides actuarialy fair benefits, political support may well increase with the extent of coverage (in particular when private alternatives are limited). With flat benefits, on the other hand, a large system may not be sustainable because a significant fraction of the population effectively pays its coverage at a price which exceed the actuarialy fair ''premium''. This paper examines the issue of political support for social insurance by explicitly recognizing the distinction between size and redistributive character. Our approach is normative in the sense that we study the appropriate design of social insurance. From that perspective, it resembles traditional second-best studies. It differs, however, in the constraints that affect the policy design. In our setting these constraints reflect the fact that some of the features of social protection are determined through a political process. Further, to concentrate on this issue, we assume away labor market distortions. Consequently, if all relevant variables were set by a welfare maximizing authority, a first-best outcome could be achieved. When the political process is accounted for, this may, however, no longer be true. The politically determined variables may then not be set at their optimal levels. Furthermore, this inefficiency may affect the determination of the remaining characteristics of social insurance.
Social insurance, such as defined here, is financed by a proportional payroll tax. It provides benefits that consist of two parts: a flat part and a variable part that is a fraction of individuals' contributions. This fraction, which we call the Bismarckian factor, defines the type of social insurance that may range from a flat-rate benefits type (which we refer to as Beveridgean) to a pure Bismarckian scheme in which all benefits are proportional to individuals' contributions. The compensation is paid in the bad state of nature, in which an individual loses his earning capacity and is without resources. Such a scheme is rather close to unemployment and disability insurance and to a lesser extent to health insurance.
Our approach is based on the recognition that while the redistributive character of a system (i.e., its more or less Bismarckian or Beveridgean design) and its size are both essential features of social protection, they are not exactly symmetric. Its redistributive character is to a large extent an integral part of the very definition of the system in itself. Bismarckian systems on the one hand and Beveridgean systems on the other hand, imply specific institutional and administrative arrangements which cannot be overturned in the short run. This is reflected by the fact that the more or less redistributive character of its social insurance system is by now often solidly anchored in a country's traditions. For some countries, like Germany and France, this tradition is obviously Bismarkian, while it is Beveridgean for others, like the UK and most Scandinavian countries.
The size of the system (i.e., the extent of coverage), on the other hand, is essentially determined by the rate of payroll taxes (through the public sector budget constraint). These variables are typically subject to more frequent adaptations (e.g., on an annual basis) and their adjustments are likely candidates to reflect political support (or the lack of it) for the social protection system.
To account for the different status of the two relevant decisions, we adopt a 4 two-stage approach. In the first, constitutional, stage the Bismarckian factor, defining the type of social insurance is chosen by a welfare-maximizing authority.
In the second stage, the payroll tax rate, determining the size of the system is chosen through majority voting. While the above argument pleads for a constitutional choice of the type of system, it is not in itself sufficient to explain why the determination of tax rates is left to the political process. Why not instead fix them constitutionally in order to bypass the potentially inefficient political process? What underlies our approach is the idea that there is some (aggregate) uncertainty which is resolved between the two stages and which makes the constitutional choice of tax rates an inadequate arrangement. This issue of constitutional vs. political choice has been addressed 5 for instance by Laffont (1996) and Boyer and Laffont (1998) . Constitutional 6 decisions are viewed as benevolent, but confined to ''rigid'' rules. Political decisions, on the other hand, are more flexible but may reflect the interest of some groups rather than those of society as a whole. Unlike these authors, we do not explicitly model this uncertainty and, consequently, we do not address the issue of constitutional vs. political choice. Instead, our purpose is to study the implications 7 of a given type of institutional arrangement.
Returning to our own setting, it will be shown that the political process in the second stage may have a crucial impact on the constitutional decision pertaining to the social protection system. If the tax rate could be directly controlled, our setting would call for a system with flat benefits (i.e., a Bismarckian factor set at zero). With majority voting in the second stage, on the other hand, the equilibrium tax rate is contingent on the Bismarckian factor, but this allows only for an indirect control. As a consequence, it may be appropriate to adopt a system which is less redistributive than otherwise optimal, in order to ensure political support and thus an adequate level of coverage in the second stage. The key parameters determining the equilibrium outcome are the earnings distribution and the concavity of the utility functions.
Whether or not private insurance is available has an important impact on the outcome. We first consider both cases separately (Sections 3 and 4) and then proceed with a comparison to assess if it may be adequate to prohibit private insurance at the constitutional stage (Sections 5 and 6). Private insurance is assumed to be costlier than public insurance but tends to be more attractive for anyone with above-average earnings. We shall show that the (un)availability of private insurance crucially affects the nature of the voting equilibrium in the second stage. Without private insurance, the individual with the median income is necessarily pivotal, while other individuals may be pivotal when private insurance 8 is available. Rather surprisingly, it also turns out that supplementary private insurance may increase the welfare of the poor, even if it is effectively bought only by the rich. Finally, it also appears that the case for prohibiting (supplementary) private insurance may become stronger when the efficiency of private insurance markets increases.
The model
The society consists of an identical number of three types of individuals. An 7 Our model could easily be adapted to accommodate aggregate uncertainty and to endogenize the political nature of the decisions on tax rates. This would give rise to a more general setting yielding our formulation as a special case.
8 From that perspective, our paper is also related to the literature which studies the equilibrium supply of publicly provided private goods with or without private supplements (and / or the possibility of ''opting out''). Epple and Romano (1996) , for instance, show that a system of public provision along with private supplements is majority preferred to either a market-only or a government-only regime. Anderberg (1999) extends their model to an insurance setting with adverse selection.
individual of type i is characterized by his (exogenous) income level w , with i 9 w , w , w . In order to focus on redistributive social insurance, we do not 1 2 3 10 explicitly consider the possibility of redistributing income through an income tax. However, one can interpret the w 's as income levels after income taxation.
i Individuals can be in two states of the world. In the first, they earn w and in the i second, they have no income and must rely on insurance benefits. To keep the notation simple, we assume that they all face the probability 1 / 2 to be in either state. Assuming further that they have identical preferences over disposable income c and insurance benefits b , their utility function is given by
where u is strictly concave (and increasing). Further, we assume that the coefficient of relative risk aversion R (x) 5 2 xu0(x)/u9(x) is non-decreasing and ian factor. Observe that (3) takes into account the budget constraint of the public 12 sector (requiring that average contributions equal average benefits). With a 5 0, ] social insurance is fully redistributive and everyone receives the same benefits tw (which equal the average contribution). On the other hand when a 5 1, individual benefits are equal to individual contributions and there is no redistribution of income. In reality, there is no country with a 5 1 or 0; what prevails is a mixture of these two canonical types of social insurance. This is why we study the possibility of a being between 0 and 1. Social benefits are then a convex 9 Our analysis can easily be extended to the case of a continuous distribution of incomes. This does not affect the results but makes their derivation more technical and less intuitive. 10 This would call for endogenous labor supply and would complicate the analysis. 11 Both of these assumptions are standard and generally considered as ''realistic''. 12 Our model is a stylized representation of a more complex setting in which each type i is characterized by w and p , the probability of losing his earning capacity. The utility function of type i i i is then given by:
combination of average and individual contributions and a higher value of a represents a less redistributive social insurance system. Observe that the rate of return of private insurance is the same for all types (income levels), while social insurance implies a rate of return which is typespecific and given by:
( 1 2 Bismarckian system). Further, one can easily verify that the ''average return'' of 13 social insurance equals one (government's budget constraint).
p Throughout the paper we shall assume that r , 1: private insurance is costlier than public insurance. This assumption may, at first, appear somewhat surprising. Many economists believe that the public sector tends to be less efficient than the private sector. This belief is one of the main rationales for privatization. However, in the case of financial intermediation, insurance and banking, one often observes that the public sector is cheaper than the private sector for two main reasons. First, social insurance is generally managed through a single administration, as opposed to private insurance which is provided by a number of companies. Consequently, social insurance benefits from sizeable scale economies. Second, the private insurance market devotes a lot of resources to advertisement, which is not the case for social insurance. These arguments are confirmed by a number of empirical studies. It is important to realize that the key efficiency enhancing feature here is 14 the collective and ''monopolistic'' nature of social insurance.
The arguments of the utility function can now be expressed in the following way:
Private and social insurance benefits are now respectively determined by:
These expressions reduce to (1)-(3) when p 5 1 / 2. They show that the correlation between w and p is i now a crucial parameter. For sickness, disability and unemployment, this is likely to be negative. In this case, one can show that the median income earner can oppose redistribution even when his income is below average income. Consequently the results we derive below for the case where w . w may also 2 apply to the (empirically more relevant) case where w , w. 14 This issue of the excess cost associated with a privately managed insurance system has been particularly studied for social security and health care. Diamond (1992) argues that these excess costs are not negligible. Mitchell (1998) in her survey shows that they vary greatly across countries and institutional settings; see also Gouyette and Pestieau (1999) . 
Consider an individual of wage w and assume for the time being that he can choose both the level of social protection (by setting t, for a given value of a) and his private insurance contribution, u. This problem provides a useful benchmark for the study of voting behavior below. The linearity of expression (5) ] Consequently, if a 5a(w) individuals of income w are indifferent between the two types of protection, while all those with lower (resp. higher) income levels strictly prefer social (resp. private) insurance.
For future reference note that:
as long as r , 1.
Private insurance prohibited
We first analyze the case where private insurance is not available. The objective of this exercise is twofold. First, there are countries where social insurance, notably in the field of health care, is not allowed. Second, if the availability of private insurance decreases ex ante social welfare, its prohibition might be 15 The problem we consider here is relevant at the voting stage only. Once t has been set, all individuals (except for the median voter) will face a tax rate which differs from their preferred level. They may then well find it optimal to supplement social protection by private insurance (if available). This problem is studied in Section 4; see (22) 
where (9) holds for all t [ [0,1] . Consequently, the objective function is concave (preferences are single-peaked) so that a majority voting equilibrium exists and is determined by the preferred tax rate of the median (pivotal) voter.
*
Before proceeding, two remarks about the properties of t are in order. First, it follows directly from (8) that 1 ] t*(w,1) 5 ;w.
(10) 2 In words, when a 5 1 (pure Bismarckian system with no redistribution) all types have the same preferred tax rate, namely t 5 1 / 2 which allows for perfect consumption smoothing across states of nature (c 5 b).
Second, differentiation of (8) yields:
Given our assumption on relative risk aversion (R . 1), this expression has the r 16 The Belgian case can be mentioned as an illustration of such a prohibition. In particular, medical insurance for outpatient expenses not covered by social insurance is prohibited by law. Similarly, supplementary pension schemes are illegal for civil servants. Admittedly, however, redistribution is not the only and probably not the main possible argument for banning private insurance in these instances. Moral hazard (when private insurance would cover the coinsurance rate) and adverse selection may provide alternative justifications. 17 To write the objective function we have substituted (5) into (1) and set u 5 0.
] same sign as w 2 w. Consequently, the preferred tax rate is a decreasing (resp. increasing) function of the Bismarckian factor for individuals with above-average 18 (resp. below-average) incomes.
We can now turn to the determination of the voting equilibrium. When t* is a monotonic (increasing or decreasing) function of w, the median voter is simply the individual with median income (namely w ). To check if this (sufficient) condition 2 holds, we use the following expression, derived from (8):
With D , 0 (expression (9)), it immediately follows that (12) is positive if (without any further restrictions required) when a is sufficiently close to 0 or 1. However, some additional technical assumptions are now required to ensure an unambiguous ranking of the different types' preferred tax rates for any value of a. These assumptions are satisfied, in particular, for the class of (exponential) utility 19 functions we consider in the illustrations below.
In what follows, we shall concentrate on the case where a median income individual is effectively the median voter so that the voting equilibrium is given by * t (a), the preferred tax rate of type 2. ] increasing or decreasing depending on whether w ,w or w .w (see expression 2 2 (11)). In words, an increase in the Bismarckian factor yields a higher (resp. lower) equilibrium tax rate when the median income is smaller (resp. larger) than the mean income. Empirically observed income distributions typically suggest that the median income is lower than the average income. However, as noted above, when * the probability of income loss is negatively correlated with income, t (a) can be 2 20 ] decreasing even when w ,w. Furthermore, when dealing with voting, abstention 2 can imply that the median income of those voting effectively be higher than the average income. Consequently, the results that emerge when the pivotal voter has above-average income may be of some relevance and we shall continue to consider both cases. 18 One can easily verify that a change in a creates conflicting income and substitution effects. With R . 1, the income effect dominates and this explains the relationship between a and t*. Figs. 1 and 2 summarize the main results of this section; they depict the profiles of preferred tax rates for both of the considered cases. It might appear surprising to find that higher income people prefer higher tax rates. However, one has to keep in mind that social insurance is here the only source of income in the bad state of nature. If the utility function is sufficiently concave, high income individuals will then prefer a higher value of b than poor individuals, even though they pay a 21 higher price for this coverage.
Constitutional stage: Rawlsian objective
We now turn to the constitutional stage at which a is determined. Utility levels are evaluated at the second-stage voting equilibrium induced by the considered value of a. Some additional notation is needed. First, define
which specifies the utility of a type i individual as a function of a and t. The index n is used to point out that there is no private insurance. The relevant utility level to * be considered at the constitutional stage is obtained by evaluating (14) at t (a) 2 21 The ''sufficient degree of concavity'' is ensured by the assumption that relative risk aversion is larger than one. ] Fig. 2 . Profile of preferred tax rates for w .w.
(the voting equilibrium given by the preferred tax rate of the median voter).
n n * Formally, we define v (a) 5V (a,t (a)).
With a Rawlsian objective, the constitutional problem then consists in maximizing the utility of the worst-off individual (namely 1) with respect to a. This first term on the RHS of (15) term measures the direct impact on the utility of 1 of an increase in a. It is negative because an increase in a implies a less redistributive system which, not surprisingly, decreases the utility of the poorest individuals. Observe in passing that if t were set directly (rather than determined through voting) only this term would be relevant so that a Beveridgean system (a 5 0) would necessarily be optimal. Now, when t is determined by voting, the indirect impact through the payroll tax (and the level of coverage) has to be accounted for; it is captured by the second term on the RHS of (15). n * To interpret and sign this term, observe first that ≠V (a,t (a)) / ≠t , 0; this 1 2
* *
follows from t (a) , t (a) along with the concavity of the individual's objective 1 2 * function (7) in the voting problem (see Section 3.1). As to dt /da, we know from 2 ] (11) that it has the same sign as (w 2 w ). Consequently, the following two cases 2 have to be distinguished:
In this case, both terms on the RHS of (15) are negative (for any a) so that the n optimal solution is given by a 5 0. This result is not surprising. As mentioned R above, the direct impact of an increase of a on the utility of type 1 is always negative. Setting a strictly positive Bismarckian factor can only be desirable if it brings the (voting equilibrium) tax rate closer to type 1's preferred rate. Now, ] when w ,w an increase in a has exactly the opposite effect. It brings about a 2 further increase of an already ''too high'' tax rate (from type 1's perspective).
To sum up, a Beveridgean system is optimal. Furthermore, the type of social protection that emerges from our two stage process is exactly the same as when t is under direct control of the (Rawlsian) public authority.
In this case, the two terms on the RHS of (15) are of opposite signs. In n particular, one can easily check that dv (0)/da now has an ambiguous sign. 1 Consequently, it is no longer necessarily optimal to set a at zero; an interior 22 solution is potentially possible though, of course, not guaranteed.
Analytically, a precise characterization of the type of solution (interior or corner) is extremely difficult (and not very insightful), even for specific utility functions. The only straightforward result is that a corner solution will prevail 23 ] when w is sufficiently close to w. However, to make our main point, namely that 2 n a . 0 is effectively possible, it is sufficient to provide numerical examples, and R this will be done in Section 6 below.
Anticipating on this, observe that the possibility of an interior solution confirms n one of the points made in the introduction. When a . 0 the political process R makes it desirable to adopt a social insurance system which is less redistributive than otherwise optimal. The level of a is then used as a device to induce a voting equilibrium tax rate (and level of coverage) which is more suitable to the poor.
Constitutional stage: utilitarian objective
Let us now reexamine the constitutional choice of a for a utilitarian (rather than Rawlsian) social welfare function. Using the notation introduced in the previous subsection, social welfare is now given by 3 3 n n n * SW (a) 5Ov (a) 5OV (a,t (a)).
The constitutional problem consists in determining a that maximizes SW (a) U U subject to 0 # a # 1. Differentiating (16) and rearranging yields:
The first term on the RHS measures the direct impact of a variation of a on welfare, while the second term measures the indirect impact, through the induced n variation in the voting equilibrium. Using expression (14), the definition of V , the i first term can be expressed as follows: increase in a (making the system less redistributive) on utilitarian welfare is thus negative. Consequently, if the tax rate were directly set by the utilitarian authority, the optimum would, once again, imply a 5 0. Like in the Rawlsian case, a . 0 can only be desirable if it induces a more ''adequate'' tax rate in the second stage. The fact that the first term on the RHS of (17) vanishes at a 5 0 has another interesting implication. It implies that the derivative at a 5 0 of social welfare reduces to:
da ≠t ≠t da n * where we have also used ≠V (a,t (a)) / ≠t ; 0 (which follows directly from the 2 2 n * definition of t ). Keeping in mind that dSW (0)/da . 0 is a sufficient condition 2 U n for a . 0, expressions (17), (18) and (19) can be used to show that with a Consequently, a positive a decreases the utility of the poorest type, but it nevertheless increases expected utility of the representative individual at the constitutional stage. A more precise characterization of the conditions under which a positive a is appropriate does not appear to be possible with general utility functions. Once again, the numerical example in Section 6 will provide some further insights.
Private insurance authorized
We now reintroduce the possibility for individuals to buy additional private insurance if the level of public insurance chosen by the pivotal voter is too low for them. Recall that private insurance coverage must be positive (u $ 0); individuals are not allowed to sell back part of their public insurance if they feel overinsured. Further, observe that supplementing social insurance by a private one is not the same as ''opting out'': buying private insurance has no impact on an individual's payroll tax bill. In other words, individuals cannot replace social insurance by private insurance.
Voting stage: the choice of t given a ]
As explained in Section 2, individuals with incomes w ,w prefer social insurance over private insurance regardless of the value of a. Consequently, type 1 ] individuals always prefer social insurance. When w ,w, the same holds for type 2 2 individuals.
] Consider now an individual with income w .w. For a 5 (r w 2w)/(w 2w), he ] is indifferent between social and private insurance; see (6). For a ,a, he prefers * private insurance; in other words, his preferred payroll tax is t 5 0. On the other ] hand, for a $a, his preferred payroll tax is given by (7); put differently, once u 5 0 individual preferences over payroll tax rates are the same as when private ] ] insurance is prohibited. Denote a 5a(w ), i 5 2,3 for the type 2 and type 3 i i individuals respectively. We are now in a position to determine the median voter and hence the tax rate chosen at the political equilibrium stage for the two cases.
] * * Consider, for instance, the case where w . w → w . One then has t → t and, at the limit, 2 1 2 1 n n * * ≠V (a,t (a)) / ≠t 5 0. Further, one has ≠V / ≠t . 0 (from (12)) and dt /da . 0 (from (11)). Conse-1 2 3 2 n n quently, dSW (0) / da . 0 which implies a . 0.
U U ] Fig. 3 . Preferred tax rates when private insurance is available and w ,w. It is interesting to note that the availability of private insurance can favor individual 1 (even though he does not effectively buy such insurance). Specifically, for low values of a, type 1 individual becomes the median voter and can choose his preferred tax rate.
The situation is now more complex; see Fig. 4 . For a ,a , types 2 and 3 2 individuals prefer private insurance. Consequently, a majority of voters is in favor 25 As a tie breaking rule, we assume that an individual who is indifferent between private and social insurance votes for his preferred social insurance protection (as defined by (7)). In contrast with the previous case, too low values of a can lead to the abandonment of social insurance by a coalition of 2 / 3. To sum up, the voting equilibrium is now given by:
Before proceeding, it is interesting to point out that both (20) and (21) imply e * t (a) # t (a). In words, for any given level of a the tax rate with private 2 insurance is less than or equal to the tax rate that obtains when only social insurance is available. Consequently, it appears that the availability of private insurance may effectively undermine political support for a given social protection system.
Constitutional stage: Rawlsian objective
The analysis of the constitutional stage proceeds along the same lines as in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. However, the type-specific utility levels achieved in the second stage have to be redefined to account for the availability of private insurance. Formally, we define
p p e and v (a) 5V (a,t (a)).
i i
In the Rawlsian case, the constitutional problem then amounts to determine p p 0 # a # 1 which maximizes v (a). We have to distinguish two cases, but in each R 1 instance, the solution is rather straightforward. ] • w ,w. Only two candidate solutions need to be considered, namely a 5 0 and a 5a . ] that a .a is dominated by a . Similarly, one easily shows that 0 , a ,a is and social insurance with a significant degree of redistribution cannot be sustained.
For the utilitarian objective, on the other hand, the comparisons appear to be ambiguous. The numerical illustration, to which we now turn, confirms that different patterns of results are effectively possible.
Numerical examples
A numerical illustration is useful for several reasons. First, it illustrates the results obtained in the previous sections. Second, it provides some additional insight regarding the determination of a at the constitutional stage, specifically in those cases where the analytical results appear to be ambiguous. Third, it yields some answers to the question of whether or not (and when) supplementary private insurance ought to be allowed.
Our benchmark example is as follows: The results are summarized in Table 1 . It appears that when w ,w the a 2 chosen at the constitutional stage is always zero (fully redistributive social insurance scheme) except for the utilitarian criterion when private insurance is ] prohibited (Section 3.3). When w .w, on the other hand, the Bismarckian factor 2 is always strictly positive and bigger with than without private insurance.
Furthermore, it is always optimal to allow private insurance. For the cases ] where w ,w this does not come as a surprise and merely confirms the analytical 2 results of Section 5. For the remaining cases, no analytical results were obtained and the examples show that private insurance may effectively be welfare improving in these settings. To complete the picture, it is now interesting to provide an illustration of the opposite result, namely that the prohibition of private insurance may be appropriate. To achieve this, just change one parameter of the model, namely the degree p of efficiency of private insurance r which is set to 0.95 instead of 0.9. Table 2 ] summarizes the results for the relevant case, namely w .w.
2
We now obtain the result that a more efficient private insurance system becomes socially undesirable. This comes from the fact that private insurance is now very attractive for type 2 individuals and some substantial redistribution is only possible when this private insurance is prohibited.
This example documents the importance of the political process in a particularly striking way. If the tax rate were set directly by the (welfare maximizing) public authorities, the availability of private insurance could only be welfare improving. Furthermore, a more efficient private system can only result in a more significant welfare improvement. When tax rates are determined through majority voting, on the other hand, both of these results may be reversed. Private insurance is no longer necessarily desirable -the fact that its availability undermines political support for social insurance may dominate its positive effects on welfare. Furthermore, a more efficient private system may now prove to be worse for it exacerbates the negative impact on political support.
Concluding comments
This paper has examined the issue of political support for social insurance by explicitly recognizing the distinction between size and redistributive character. In our two-stage procedure, the Bismarckian factor is chosen at the constitutional level on the basis of either a Rawlsian or a utilitarian social welfare function. The tax rate is then chosen at the second stage by majority voting.
The main results regarding the optimal level of the Bismarckian factor in the Table 3 The optimal level a in the different casesw Table 3 . The main conclusions that have emerged are the following. First, it may be appropriate to adopt a system which is less redistributive than otherwise optimal, in order to ensure political support for an adequate level of coverage in the second stage. Second, as expected, private insurance does undermine the political support for social insurance. Third, supplementary private insurance may nevertheless increase the welfare of the poor, even if it is effectively bought only by the rich. Fourth, and last, the case for prohibiting (supplementary) private insurance may become stronger when the efficiency of private insurance markets increases. Finally, let us return to one of our main assumptions, namely the fact that a has been restricted to be nonnegative. This hypothesis has permitted us to concentrate on the choice between Bismarckian and Beveridgean systems, while allowing for ''intermediate'' programs. However, our analysis could easily been extended to the case where negative values of a are permitted, which effectively would amount to 32 considering ''targeted'' benefits. This possibility would be especially relevant when private insurance is available so that the rich can carry income between states of nature. Formally this extension can easily be dealt with and our main results would remain valid. In particular, the finding that the political process may make it desirable to set a at a higher than otherwise level would effectively be 33 reinforced (and arise in a larger number of situation). As far as the interpretation (and relevance) of the results is concerned, the application of our setting to the problem of targeting would, however, have to be considered with great care. In particular, it neglects some aspects, such as labor market distortions and / or discontinuities in the effective benefits, which are likely to be crucial for the assessment of targeted policies.
